Threat model chaining and attack simulation systems and related methods

ABSTRACT

Threat model chaining methods include providing one or more databases including a threat model components, threats, each threat associated with at least one of the threat model components, and compensating controls, each compensating control associate with one of the threats, providing a diagram interface configured to display a relational diagram defining a first threat model, and configuring the diagram interface to add a component group to the first threat model include in it a second threat model. Attack simulation methods include providing the one or more databases and diagram interface and configuring the diagram interface to visually display attack paths of threats associated with diagrammed threat model components which compromise a selected threat model component. Attack simulation systems include one or more computing devices coupled with one or more databases configured to store and interrelate threats, threat model components, and compensating controls, and allow diagramming and defining of threat models.

CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This document is a continuation-in-part application of U.S. patentapplication Ser. No. 15/922,856 titled “Threat Model Chaining and AttackSimulation Systems and Methods,” naming as first inventor AnuragAgarwal, filed Mar. 15, 2018, now pending, which in turn is acontinuation-in-part application of U.S. patent application Ser. No.15/888,021 titled “Threat Modeling Systems and Related Methods IncludingCompensating Controls,” naming as first inventor Anurag Agarwal, filedFeb. 3, 2018, (hereinafter the '021 application), which in turn claimsthe benefit of the filing date of U.S. Provisional Pat. App. Ser. No.62/507,691 titled “System and Method of Including Compensating Controlsin a Threat Modeling Process,” naming as first inventor Anurag Agarwal,filed May 17, 2017, now expired, and which '021 application also claimsthe benefit of the filing date of U.S. Provisional Pat. App. Ser. No.62/527,671 titled “System and Method for Identifying and Analyzing thePotential Attack Surface of a Complex System,” naming first inventorAnurag Agarwal, filed Jun. 30, 2017, and which '021 application alsoclaims the benefit of the filing date of U.S. Provisional Pat. App. Ser.No. 62/530,295 titled “Method and Apparatus for Early Implementation ofEnterprise DevSecOps,” naming first inventor Anurag Agarwal, filed Jul.10, 2017, now expired, and which '021 application also claims thebenefit of the filing date of U.S. Provisional Pat. App. Ser. No.62/520,954 titled “System and Method for Identifying Potential Threatsto a Complex System,” naming first inventor Anurag Agarwal, filed Jun.16, 2017, now expired, the disclosures of each of which are herebyincorporated entirely herein by reference.

BACKGROUND 1. Technical Field

Aspects of this document relate generally to threat modeling processesand systems.

2. Background Art

Threat modeling is a process by which vulnerabilities of a system orprocess may be detailed and prioritized. One example of an existingthreat modeler is a modeler marketed under the name THREAT MODELING TOOLby Microsoft Corporation of Redmond, Wash. Threat modeling allows a userto analyze potential attack vectors and prioritize vulnerabilities.While some threat modeling involves threats related to computingnetworks and systems, threat modeling in general encompasses a broaderscope and may involve modeling threats in non-computer-related systemsand processes. Some commercial threat modeling tools utilize a dynamicquestion and answer user interface which generally relies on anunderlying data flow diagram (DFD) or process flow diagram (PFD)conceptual basis.

With regards to modeling computing networks, traditional threat modelingsystems and methods exist for assessing risk from potential cyberthreats at an individual application level without fully accounting forapplication-application interactions, thereby miscalculatingorganizational risk. Other systems and methods exist for discoveringvulnerabilities to applications deployed in cyber environments bysurveying applications. These rely on recognizing previously identifiedand cataloged vulnerability signatures and are not designed to surveynon-application items included in an organization's cyber environment,nor can these systems recognize which threats newly introduced to acyber system are relevant to security, nor can these systems perform“what-if” scenarios as part of an organization's risk managementanalysis. Existing methodologies also do not provide for communicatingthe risks associated with identified threats in a way that non-securityexperts easily appreciate or understand.

Accordingly, traditional threat modeling methodologies have thefollowing weaknesses: (1) they are effective in analyzing only singleapplications operating in isolation on a predetermined infrastructure;(2) they require security subject-matter experts for their creation,use, and maintenance; (3) they are resource-intensive to build andmaintain, and; (4) they cannot be effectively used to scale a threatmodeling practice to meet the needs of enterprises generating tens ofsoftware applications per year. Traditional threat modelingmethodologies also cannot be easily integrated into existing agilesoftware development approaches or with DevOps practices, and so areoften rejected by agile developers and operational teams asnon-productive.

Existing threat modeling methodologies also do not help organizationsunderstand: (1) the nature of application interactions; (2) the user ofshared components; (3) the effect of including third-party elementswithin the IT ecosystem; (4) the downstream impact should potentialthreats be realized; (5) the nature of the organization's comprehensiveattack surface; (6) the explicit nature of the organization's attackerpopulation; (7) the effectiveness of deployed or contemplatedcompensating controls; or (8) a means to communicate the potentialimpact should threats be realized without communicating confidentialinformation or security details which could further expose theorganization to risk from potential threats.

SUMMARY

Embodiments of threat model chaining methods may include: providing oneor more databases, the one or more databases including: a plurality ofthreat model components stored therein; a plurality of threats storedtherein, each threat associated with at least one of the threat modelcomponents through the one or more databases; and a plurality ofcompensating controls stored therein, each compensating controlassociated with at least one of the threats through the one or moredatabases; providing one or more interfaces, including a diagraminterface, configured to be displayed on one or more end user computingdevices communicatively coupled with the one or more databases;configuring the diagram interface to display a relational diagram of oneof a system, an application, and a process, using visual representationsof one or more of the threat model components and visual representationsof one or more of the compensating controls, the relational diagramdefining a first threat model, and; configuring the diagram interfaceto, in response to receiving one or more user inputs, add a componentgroup to the first threat model and thereby redefine the first threatmodel by including in it a second threat model associated with thecomponent group, wherein the component group includes a predefinedinterrelated group of two or more of the threat model components.

Embodiments of threat model chaining methods may include one or more orall of the following:

Configuring the diagram interface to, in response to receiving a userselection of one of the diagrammed threat model components of the firstthreat model, visually display attack paths of all threats associatedwith the diagrammed threat model components which compromise theselected threat model component.

Configuring the one or more interfaces to, in response to receiving oneor more user inputs, store one or more additional threat modelcomponents in the one or more databases, store one or more additionalthreats in the one or more databases, associate each additional threatwith at least one of the additional threat model components through theone or more databases, store one or more additional compensatingcontrols in the one or more databases, and associate each additionalcompensating control with at least one of the additional threats throughthe one or more databases.

Embodiments of attack simulation methods may include: providing one ormore databases, the one or more databases including: a plurality ofthreat model components stored therein; a plurality of threats storedtherein, each threat associated with at least one of the threat modelcomponents through the one or more databases; and a plurality ofcompensating controls stored therein, each compensating controlassociated with at least one of the threats through the one or moredatabases; providing one or more interfaces, including a diagraminterface, configured to be displayed on one or more end user computingdevices communicatively coupled with the one or more databases;configuring the diagram interface to display a relational diagram of oneof a system, an application, and a process, using visual representationsof one or more of the threat model components and visual representationsof one or more of the compensating controls, the relational diagramdefining a first threat model; and configuring the diagram interface to,in response to receiving a user selection of one of the diagrammedthreat model components of the first threat model through the one ormore interfaces, visually display attack paths of all threats associatedwith the diagrammed threat model components which compromise theselected threat model component.

Embodiments of attack simulation methods may include one or more or allof the following:

Configuring the diagram interface to, in response to receiving one ormore user inputs through the one or more interfaces, visually displayone or more attack paths which pass through multiple diagrammed threatmodel components of the first threat model.

Configuring the diagram interface to, in response to receiving a usertoggle of one of the diagrammed compensating controls (hereinafter“first control”) of the first threat model to an on state through theone or more interfaces, toggle all attack paths mitigatable by the firstcontrol to a mitigated display state.

Configuring the diagram interface to, in response to receiving a usertoggle of the first control to an off state through the one or moreinterfaces, toggle all attack paths mitigatable by the first control toan unmitigated display state.

Configuring the diagram interface to, in response to receiving one ormore user inputs through the one or more interfaces to remove the firstcontrol from the first threat model, toggle all attack paths mitigatableby the first control to an unmitigated display state.

Configuring the diagram interface to, in response to receiving one ormore user inputs through the one or more interfaces, visually displayonly attack paths of all threats associated with a subset of thediagrammed threat model components.

Configuring the diagram interface to, in response to receiving one ormore user inputs through the one or more interfaces to alter a profileof an attacking component, alter the visually displayed attack paths.

Configuring the diagram interface to receive one or more user inputs toadd a component group to the first threat model and thereby redefine thefirst threat model by including in it a second threat model associatedwith the component group, wherein the component group includes apredefined interrelated group of two or more of the threat modelcomponents.

Embodiments of attack simulation systems may include: one or morecomputing devices communicatively coupled with one or more databases,the one or more computing devices displaying, on one or more displays ofthe one or more computing devices: one or more input interfacesconfigured to, in response to receiving one or more user inputs, store aplurality of user-defined threat model components in the one or moredatabases, store a plurality of threats in the one or more databases,associate each of the threats with at least one of the threat modelcomponents through the one or more databases, store a plurality ofcompensating controls in the one or more databases, and associate eachcompensating control with at least one of the threats through the one ormore databases, and; a diagram interface configured to, in response toreceiving one or more user inputs, diagram one of a system, anapplication, and a process, the diagram including one or more of thethreat model components and one or more of the compensating controls, todefine a first threat model, the first threat model including allthreats associated through the one or more databases with the diagrammedthreat model components; wherein the diagram interface is configured to,in response to receiving a selection of one of the diagrammed threatmodel components of the first threat model, visually display attackpaths of all threats associated with the diagrammed threat modelcomponents which compromise the selected threat model component.

Embodiments of attack simulation systems may include one or more or allof the following:

The diagram interface may be configured to, in response to receiving auser input to toggle one of the diagrammed compensating controls(hereinafter “first control”) to an on state, toggle all attack pathsmitigatable by the first control to a mitigated display state.

The diagram interface may be configured to, in response to receiving auser input to toggle the first control to an off state, toggle allattack paths mitigatable by the first control to an unmitigated displaystate.

The diagram interface may be configured to, in response to receiving oneor more user inputs removing the first control from the first threatmodel, toggle all attack paths mitigatable by the first control to anunmitigated display state.

The diagram interface may be configured to, in response to receiving oneor more user inputs, visually display only attack paths of all threatsassociated with a subset of the diagrammed threat model components.

The diagram interface may be configured to, in response to receiving oneor more user inputs, alter a profile of an attacking component, whereinthe alteration alters the visually displayed attack paths.

The one of a system, an application, and a process may be a computingnetwork.

The diagram interface may be further configured to, in response toreceiving one or more user inputs, diagram a communication protocolbetween two of the diagrammed threat model components, the diagrammedcommunication protocol including an alphanumeric indicator.

The diagram interface may be configured to, in response to receiving oneor more user inputs, add a component group to the first threat model andthereby redefine the first threat model by including in it a secondthreat model associated with the component group, wherein the componentgroup includes a predefined interrelated group of two or more of thethreat model components.

General details of the above-described embodiments, and otherembodiments, are given below in the DESCRIPTION, the DRAWINGS, and theCLAIMS.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

Embodiments will be discussed hereafter using reference to the includeddrawings, briefly described below, wherein like designations refer tolike elements:

FIG. 1 is a diagram representatively illustrating an implementation of athreat modeling system (threat model chaining system) (attack simulationsystem) (system);

FIG. 2 is a block diagram representatively illustrating animplementation of a threat modeling method;

FIG. 3 is a block diagram representatively illustrating animplementation of a threat modeling method;

FIG. 4 is a flowchart representatively illustrating an implementation ofa threat modeling method;

FIG. 5 is a flowchart representatively illustrating an implementation ofa threat modeling method;

FIG. 6 is an implementation of an interface of the system of FIG. 1;

FIG. 7 is an implementation of an interface of the system of FIG. 1;

FIG. 8 is an implementation of an interface of the system of FIG. 1;

FIG. 9 is an implementation of an interface of the system of FIG. 1;

FIG. 10 is an implementation of an interface of the system of FIG. 1;

FIG. 11 is an implementation of an interface of the system of FIG. 1;

FIG. 12 is an implementation of an interface of the system of FIG. 1;

FIG. 13 is an implementation of an interface of the system of FIG. 1;

FIG. 14 is a block diagram representatively illustrating animplementation of an attack simulation method;

FIG. 15 is an implementation of an interface of the system of FIG. 1;

FIG. 16 is a flowchart representatively illustrating an implementationof a threat modeling method;

FIG. 17 is an attack tree diagram representatively illustrating anattack path of a threat of a threat model;

FIG. 18 is a block diagram representatively illustrating attack paths ofmultiple threats of a threat model;

FIG. 19 is the block diagram of FIG. 18 with compensated controls addedto the diagram;

FIG. 20 is a block diagram of an asset classification method of anattack simulation method;

FIG. 21 is an implementation of an interface of the system of FIG. 1,and;

FIG. 22 is an implementation of an interface of the system of FIG. 1.

DESCRIPTION

Implementations/embodiments disclosed herein (including those notexpressly discussed in detail) are not limited to the particularcomponents or procedures described herein. Additional or alternativecomponents, assembly procedures, and/or methods of use consistent withthe intended system and method of including compensating controls in athreat modeling process may be utilized in any implementation. This mayinclude any materials, components, sub-components, methods, sub-methods,steps, and so forth.

As used herein, the term “input field” includes a “selector.” Forexample, a button or space on a user interface in which a user may movea cursor to and click to make a selection, and a checkbox field, andother similar fields, as well as alphanumeric input fields, are all“input fields” as used herein.

The term “compensating control” in implementations herein may be analternative mechanism to a security requirement or standard issued by astandards-issuing body that is allowed by the standards-issuing bodywhen the security requirement or standard as stated cannot be met by aparty due to legitimate technical or documented business constraints.

In the payment card industry (PCI), as a non-limiting example,compensating controls were introduced in Payment Card Industry DataSecurity Standard (PCI DSS) 1.0 to give organizations an alternative tosecurity requirements that could not be met due to legitimatetechnological or business constraints. According to the PCI Council,which was the standards-issuing body issuing the standard (jointlycreated by the four major credit-card companies VISA, MASTERCARD,DISCOVER, and AMERICAN EXPRESS), compensatory controls in that industrymust: (1) meet the intent and rigor of the original stated requirement;(2) provide a similar level of defense as the original statedrequirement; (3) be “above and beyond” other PCI DSS requirements (notsimply in compliance with other PCI DSS requirements); and (4) becommensurate with the additional risk imposed by not adhering to theoriginal stated requirement. Examples of compensating controls forinformation technology may include: using audit trails and logs forpayroll management instead of segregation of duties (having twoindividuals responsible for separate parts of payroll management); theuse of database security applications and services, network accesscontrol (NAC), data leak prevention strategies, and e-mail encryption inlieu of comprehensive encryption (i.e., in lieu of converting allelectronic data into ciphertext and changing cryptographic keysperiodically); two-factor authentication with a change of password every60 days in lieu of long complex passwords; and so forth.

Notwithstanding the above, in implementations herein “compensatingcontrol” may have a more general definition. For example, inimplementations a “security requirement” may be defined as a mechanismfor stopping or closing a threat at the source of the threat, and a“compensating control” may be defined as a mechanism for stopping orclosing a threat not at the source, but between the source and someprotected component (i.e., preventing a threat emanating from a sourcefrom reaching a protected component). In other implementations a“security requirement” may be defined as a hardware solution and a“compensating control” may be defined as a software solution, such as achange in the code or software added to a system. In still otherimplementations a “security requirement” may be generally defined as anysolution which is costlier or more time consuming and a “compensatingcontrol” may be defined as a solution which is not as secure orsure-proof as the relevant security requirement but which is lesscost-prohibitive or time-prohibitive.

The threat modeling system and related methods discussed herein areimplemented using computing devices and/or networks. Referring to FIG.1, an implementation of a threat modeling system (threat model chainingsystem) (attack simulation system) (system) 100 is shown. FIG. 1 onlyshows a representative example, and there are many other contemplatedsystems that could be used to implement the threat modeling processes.System 100 includes a computing device 102 having a display 104. Whilethe computing device is drawn as a desktop computer it could be alaptop, a mobile phone or tablet, or any other type of computing device.The same goes for all other computing devices shown in the drawings.

Device 102 is shown communicatively coupled with server 106 which iscommunicatively coupled with a database (DB) 108. The coupling may bedirect, such as through a wired connection, or through a local areanetwork (LAN), or remotely through telecommunication network 110 (whichmay be the Internet). In some systems the server and database could behoused on the same machine as the computing device 102 usingvirtualization. In implementations device 102 could be accessed by anadministrator of the system to choose settings, add or remove users, addor remove items from the database, and so forth. System 100 only showsone computing device 102, though in implementations the number ofcomputing devices 102 may be scaled up to any number. Likewise, only oneserver and database are shown, but these also may be scaled up to anynumber as needed.

Other computing devices may be included in system 100. Computing device112 includes display 114 and is an example of a computing device whichis communicatively coupled with device 102 both directly (such asthrough a hardwired or wireless LAN), and coupled directly with theserver (such as through a hardwired or wireless LAN), and also may becoupled with the server and/or the device 102 through telecommunicationnetwork 110. System 100 is shown with only one device 112 but inimplementations it could be scaled up to any number of devices 112.

Computing device (device) 116 is an example of a computing device thatis not directly coupled with either device 102 or the server but is onlycoupled thereto through the telecommunications network 110.Nevertheless, device 116 may access the server and database through thetelecommunications network. Although only one device 116 is shown, thismay be scaled up to any number. Device 116 has a display 118, as shown.

Also shown are a web server 120 and a remote server (server) 122, eachof which may be included in implementations of system 100. Bynon-limiting example, device 116 may access the server 106 and databasethrough the web server 120, such as by navigating to a uniform resourcelocator (URL) and providing login credentials. Computing devices 102 and112 could do the same. Although only one web server is shown, this maybe scaled up to any number as needed.

None of the computing devices shown in FIG. 1 are directly coupled withremote server 122, which may by non-limiting example be a third-partyserver, or multiple servers (such as a portion of a server rack) or anyportion thereof. System 100 could, for example, exclude server 106, andutilize only remote servers 122 which have access to the database 108(which may be stored on the remote servers), and each of the computingdevices may access the database through the remote servers and throughone or more described web servers such as through one or more userinterfaces displayed on the displays of the computing devices whenaccessing correlated URLs.

In other implementations one or more application servers could beincluded in the system, the application server(s) positionedrelationship-wise between an end-user device and the database(s) tofacilitate operation of the methods that will be later described.

As indicated, these are only examples of how to implement a threatmodeling system, and many other layouts are possible. System 100 mayalso include many other elements which are not shown for brevity. In asmall business or organization wherein only one computing device may beneeded to do threat modeling, system 100 could be implemented using asingle computing device 102 with a database 108 stored thereon, or withone computing device 102 coupled with a server 106 and database 108through a local connection (wired or hardwired), or using a cloud-storeddatabase that the users access through user interfaces through remoteservers 122 and/or web servers 120. In an organization in which multiplecomputing devices may need to do threat modeling the system 100 could beimplemented using a computing device 102 having the database storedthereon, or coupled through a local or Internet connection to a database108 stored elsewhere within the organization's computing devices such ason a server 106 or remotely on remote servers 122 accessed via a webserver 120, with other computing devices 112 and/or 116 coupled eitherdirectly with device 102 and/or 106 and/or through the telecommunicationnetwork 110. In implementations in which remote servers are utilizedthese may be scaled up to any needed number.

The threat modeling system and methods include the modeling of threatsutilizing software which users access and interact with through avariety of user interfaces, some examples of which will be describedhereafter, but a brief description of the processes facilitated by thesoftware will now be discussed.

Referring to FIG. 2, a representative example of a threat modelingprocess (process) (method) 200 includes generating a threat model(model) 208 for any application, process, or system under consideration.By non-limiting example, this could include modeling the possiblethreats to commuting to work safely, modeling the possible threats topreventing the spread of an infectious disease, or modeling the possibleattacks on a computer network (cybersecurity). Model 208 is used togenerate an original threat report (report) 214 which in implementationsincludes identified threats, the status of identified threats (threatstatus), and the source(s) of identified threats, among other things.

As illustrated in FIG. 2, process 200 may include storing a plurality ofthreats 202 and threat model components (components) 204 in a data store206. This may include, by non-limiting example, storing titles,definitions or descriptions, and/or associated images in the database108 for each component and/or threat. The threats and components areused to create threat model 208.

Process 200 in implementations includes a user selecting from among theavailable components those components which are relevant to any givensystem, process or application. This is represented by the arrow between“components” and “relevant sources.” The relevant sources 212 arerelevant sources of threats that are determined by the system 100 eitherafter, or while, the user is selecting the components that are involvedin the specific application, system or process and definingrelationships between and among the relevant components. The system alsoretrieves from the database relevant threats 210 that were previouslycorrelated with the chosen components or combinations of componentsthrough the database, to form the threat model 208 (this isrepresentatively illustrated by the arrow between “threats” and“relevant threats”). The threat model thus includes relevant threats andthe relevant sources of those threats. The threat model is used togenerate a threat report 214.

There may be some components with which no threat is associated (andthey are therefore not relevant sources of threats), and there may besome threats that are dependent on one or more relationships betweencomponents. For example, when modeling a computing network somecomponents may communicate with one another using a hypertext transferprotocol secure (HTTPS) protocol or instead with a transmission controlprotocol (TCP), and this relationship may determine whether there is arelevant threat to include in the model (or which relevant threat toinclude in the model). Although these relationships between componentsare communicative couplings and/or protocols in some instances, therelationships themselves may be considered “components” in a broad senseso that, in FIG. 2, the potential relationship types between componentswould themselves be considered components 204 that are stored in thedata store and which the user utilizes to build a diagram of the system,application or process. Communication protocols may use conductive wires(electric signals), optic fibers (optic signals), wireless technologies(electromagnetic signals), and so forth.

FIG. 2 is a simplified diagram. Each component and each plurality ofcomponents is a potential relevant source for one or more threats. Forexample, one threat may be “Bluejacking” and one component, which wouldbe correlated to this threat through the database, could be “BLUETOOTHport.” Accordingly, if a user includes a BLUETHOOTH port in a diagram ofa computing system, the system 100 will identify that port as a relevantsource for bluejacking in the associated threat model and threat report.The component in this example is a physical component of a computingdevice or system/network. In other implementations components/sourcesmay not be physical components. For example, if one is modeling thethreats involved in commuting to work safely one threat may be “freewaycollision” and one component, which would be correlated with this threatthrough the database, would be “merging onto freeway.” Thus, in thislatter example “merging onto freeway” would be a relevant source for“freeway collision.” In this example the component (and relevant source)is defined as an action or step, and not as a physical component.

Regardless of whether the threats and components/sources are physicalelements or steps, actions, etc., the database allows for thecorrelation of any threat to any number of components and likewise, thecorrelation of any component to any number of threats. Accordingly,using the above example, the BLUETOOTH port may be defined as a relevantsource for a Bluejacking threat, but it may not be the only relevantsource (another source may be a BLUETOOTH device wirelessly connectedwith the system being analyzed). Similarly, Bluejacking may be definedas one threat that may occur due to vulnerabilities of the BLUETOOTHport, but there may be other vulnerabilities or threats that are presentin the system due to the BLUETOOTH port.

Referring to FIG. 3, another implementation of a threat modeling process(process) (method) 300 is shown. Method 300 includes the steps describedabove with respect to FIG. 2 but also includes additional steps. Amodified data store 302 includes data store 206 but also includescompensating controls 304 stored in the database. The storedcompensating controls include, by non-limiting example, a title,definition, image, and/or other items for each compensating control.Each compensating control may be associated with one or more threatsand/or with one or more components and/or with one or more securityrequirements through the database (security requirements may in turn beassociated with one or more components and/or one or more threatsthrough the database). Method 300 includes user selection of one or morecompensating controls (relevant compensating controls 308) from amongall compensating controls 304 stored in the database, and the relevantcompensating controls together with the threat model 208 previouslydiscussed (in other words the relevant threats 210 and relevant sources212) are included in the modified threat model 306. Modified threatmodel is used to generate modified threat report 310.

Referring now to FIG. 4, method 300 may include other steps and may beshown by threat modeling process (process) (method) 400 which includescreating a threat model of the application, system or process ofinterest (step 402), generating a threat report based on the threatmodel identifying relevant threats (step 404), generating a modifiedthreat model with the status of one or more threats changed to“mitigated” using one or more of the relevant compensating controls(step 406), and generating a modified threat report and/or a change logincluding the threats designated as “mitigated” by the one or morerelevant compensating controls (step 408).

Referring now to FIG. 5, another implementation of a threat modelingprocess (process) (method) 500 is representatively illustrated. Method500 includes cycling through the process of selecting/deselecting acompensating control (i.e., adding it to the threat model, or removingit) as often as the user chooses. After the threat model is initiallybuilt and the initial threat report is generated (step 502) the user maydefine a compensating control (step 504) (this step may also be donebefore the threat model has been built or the threat report generated).The user may select the threats mapped to the compensating controland/or deselect threats mapped to the compensating control (step 506).

The user may add the compensating control to the threat model andthereby modify the model (step 508). System 100 matches threatsidentified in the original threat model with those mapped to theselected compensating control (step 510). The user at this point may beable to further modify the threats mapped to the compensating control.The status of every matched threat may be changed to “mitigated” or someother status by the user (step 512). A modified threat report may thenbe generated (step 514). The user is then brought to a point at whichhe/she may select whether to revert the model to its previous state(step 516). If the user selects to not revert the model, the processskips to step 522, otherwise the compensating control is removed fromthe model (step 518) and the status of matched threats are reverted totheir pre-matched values (step 520). The user then determines whether toadd another compensating control (step 522) and if so the process cyclesto step 504 again, otherwise the process ends.

Reference will now be made to several example user interfaces which maybe utilized to accomplish the above general processes and otherprocesses as will be described. It should be stressed that these areonly examples, and that other user interfaces could be used toaccomplish the methods. Similarly, although specific user interfaces aredescribed with respect to specific functionalities (dropdown menus,buttons, fields, tags, text prediction, etc.), the practitioner ofordinary skill in the art will be able to mix and match thesefunctionalities and/or use other functionalities with the userinterfaces to make the user experience intuitive and easy. For example,in instances where a dropdown menu is present this could be replaced bya search field, or a radio button selection, and so forth. Nevertheless,the user interface implementations as depicted in the drawings areuseful for a variety of reasons, as will be understood.

Referring now to FIG. 6, a representative example of a user interface(interface) 600 is shown. This interface is titled the “knowledge base”page and may be displayed on any of the displays of system 100 shown inFIG. 1, depending on the particular system setup. Interface 600 has anumber of selectors or menu items near the top of the screen such as, bynon-limiting example, a three-bar menu selector, a “select all”selector, a “new” selector, an “edit” selector, a “delete” selector, a“copy to library” selector, a “select library” dropdown selector, a“home” selector, a “knowledge base” selector, a “templates” selector, a“profile” selector, a “change password” selector, and a “sign out”selector. In implementations some of these selectors may be furtherorganized into dropdowns so as to take up less space on the interface.Additionally, in implementations of system 100 some or all of the menuitems may be present on other interfaces, such that they are permanentmenu items at the top of those other interfaces as the user navigatesfrom one interface/page to another.

This “knowledge base” interface is an interface where the user may viewand edit “components” that are stored in the database. The title“components” is thus present at the left near the top of the screen, andbelow this are three columns for “name,” “type,” and “labels.” Below thecolumn titles are search boxes where a user may begin typing andpredictive text will bring up a list of items that begin with theletters typed so far. Each row shows one component type, name, andlabels (if any). The list is scrollable as indicated by the scroll bar,and only a small number of components are listed here. For example, thetopmost item is a WiFi router (named WIFI RTR in shorthand, and this andany other text used in the system may be in some type of shorthand ormay be spelled out in its entirety in various implementations), its typeis “Device,” and no labels are applied. Shown in FIG. 6 are thefollowing types: device, IoT device (which represents “internet ofthings” device), communication protocols (such as HTTPS), generic datastore, database, application component, and deployment component. Otheravailable types not shown may include, by non-limiting example: cloud,external system, FTP server, generic external interactor, genericprocess, generic trust boundary, Modbus, perimeter control, third partysoftware, third party library, transaction, WINDOWS application, WINDOWSOS, and so forth. These are only representative examples, and the usermay define new types as desired and apply those types to a new component(or existing component), which will associate the type with thecomponent name through the database. The rows may be organized inalphabetical order by any of the columns (name, type, labels) byclicking on the title of the column and may be organized in reversealphabetical order by again clicking on the same column header (andtoggled with continued clicking). The labels column may be useful for,among other things, searching for components that have a label applied.For example, if the user is looking for embedded system components, theuser may search in the labels column for “embedded system” (or ashortened version if the system uses a shortened version) to find allcomponents that have the embedded system tag applied.

A user may select any row by clicking anywhere in that row. The selectedrow will be highlighted, as representatively illustrated in FIG. 6wherein the “login” row is highlighted. Once a row is highlighted anydata associated with the component through the database is shown to theright. For example, in the middle of the screen the component name“login” and its type “application component” are shown. Below this thetags applied to this component are shown, which in this case include:web, application, feature, authentication, password. A description canbe associated with the component through the database—in this case nodescription has been provided. If a user desires to edit the name, type,labels, or description the above “edit” selector may be selected and theuser will be able to input new information for any of these fields,which upon pressing a “cancel” button will revert to the prior data orupon pressing a “save” button will write the new data to the database.

Interface 600 also shows a “properties” section to the right, whichshows the threats and security requirements associated with thiscomponent through the database. The user may press the plus icons to addnew threats or security requirements, as desired, or may use the “X”icons to remove threats and/or security requirements associated with thecomponent through the database. In this example the login component hasthe following threats associated with it: inducing account lockout;session hijacking; and clickjacking. The security requirementsassociated with the component in this example are: parameterizedqueries—dynamic SQL; breach—randomizing secrets per request; andencryption algorithm (the first two only show a short description on theinterface screen for ease of viewing).

The threats and security requirements associated with the componentthrough the database will at least partially facilitate the later threatmodeling when a user is depicting a specific system layout. For example,if a user is depicting a computer system layout and adds the “login”component to the system layout then one or more or all of the associatedthreats may become “relevant threats” to the overall system aspreviously described. In some systems 100 all the threats associatedwith this element would become “relevant threats” to the specificapplication, process, or system being modeled, and in other systems 100some of these threats may be automatically dropped from “relevantthreats” for the specific application, process or system being modeledif other components added to the system would inherently mitigate thosethreats (such as an HTTPS protocol instead of HTTP protocol being usedbetween two components).

With regards to the other selectors, a user may select the “select all”option to select all components then listed (if the user has done asearch this would limit to selecting all those components populated bythe search), and the user may then press the delete selector to deleteall of these components and their relationships (associated threats,security requirements, tags, descriptions, etc.) from the database. Theuser may instead, once all are selected, press the “copy to library”selector to copy the selected items to a default library set up by theuser previously through another interface. The user may similarly selectonly one or a few components to delete or copy to the default library.The “select library” selector allows a user to display variouslibraries, here the “ThreatModeler” library is displayed but the usermay create his/her own libraries, may view other built-in libraries orthird-party libraries accessible through the interface through a webserver or other server which communicates with another third-partydatabase, and so forth.

The user may select the “new” icon to bring up a popup interface inwhich the user may define a new component, giving it a name, selectingthe component type from a dropdown menu, adding an image to be displayedto represent the component (such as a lock for a security feature, a USBindicator for a USB device, etc.), labels, and a description, and maythen select a “cancel” selector to cancel the new component or mayselect a “save” selector to write the new component information andrelationships to the database, and selecting either save or cancel willalso remove the popup interface and revert back to interface 600.

The home menu item at the top right of the screen will navigate the userto a home screen. The knowledge base icon will navigate to interface600. The templates selector navigates to an interface similar tointerface 1000 of FIG. 10 (hereinafter described) but with a blankcanvas 1002 for creating a new template which may be used later forcreating other relational diagrams (diagrams) 1004 (also describedhereafter). The profile selector brings up a popup window which displaysthe current user's name, email, department, role (admin, etc.), and lastlogin date/time as stored in the database, and a close button to closethe window. The change password selector brings up a popup window tochange the user's password with a “close” selector to cancel the changeand a “save” selector to write the new data to the database. Inimplementations the home, templates, and knowledge base icons arepermanently displayed at the top of all interfaces of system 100 and theprofile, change password, and sign out selectors are available from adropdown icon which is also displayed at the top of all interfaces ofsystem 100. The sign out selector allows the user to log out of thesystem. Interface 600, as well as other interfaces of the system, mayalso include a refresh selector to refresh the page and a help icon tobring up a help menu. An icon displaying a title and/or logo of thesoftware may also be displayed at the top of the screen (such as the topleft) which when selected may navigate to the home screen.

When the triple-bar menu icon is selected it brings up a popupexpandable menu which, when all items are fully expanded, appears asinterface 700 of FIG. 7. The “threat library” menu item includes thesub-menu items “threats,” “test cases,” and “threat agents,” the“security requirements” menu item includes the sub-menu items shown, the“threat patterns” menu item includes the sub-menu items shown, and the“enterprise” menu item includes the sub-menu item “users.” When any ofthe sub-menu items are selected an interface very similar to interface600 is displayed.

For example, FIG. 8 shows interface 800 which is accessed by selectingthe “threats” sub-menu item. The title “threats” is shown near the topof a list of threats which are organized into rows and columns showingeach threat's name, risk level, and attached labels. Several threats areshown, and any column may be searched using the search box directlybelow the name, risk, or labels headers, which behaves similarly asdescribed for FIG. 6, and the data may be organized alphabetically (orreverse alphabetically) by any column as described with respect tointerface 600. The selected threat is highlighted, and its informationis displayed to the right including the name, risk level, labels, and adescription, which in this case includes a URL. The properties sectionincludes threat agents which may be added, though none are added to thisthreat—but examples include things like “insider,” “black hat,”“hacktivist,” “cyber terrorists,” “authorized external user,” and soforth which are threat agents that had previously been identified by theuser. Threat agents may be added and removed. Test cases may also beadded and removed, this threat has three test cases added which werepreviously entered into the database by the user. Security requirementsmay also be added by the user and, in this way, compensating controlsmay be associated with specific threats through the database—this is oneof the ways the system facilitates step 506 of FIG. 5. Securityrequirements may be added to the database originally through anotherinterface, described hereafter, and identified there as a compensatingcontrol, then added to a specific threat from interface 800. Such anassociation through the database facilitates the system displayingvarious compensating controls in a diagrammed system, method orapplication and the threats those compensating controls can mitigate.

The menu items at the top of FIG. 8 are the same commands/links as thoseshown in FIG. 6 but are shown here in icon format to give anotherrepresentative example, where the select all selector is represented bya checkmark, the new selector is represented by a plus icon, the editselector is represented by a pencil icon, the delete selector isrepresented by an “X” icon, the copy to library selector is representedby an icon of two documents, the home selector is represented by a homeicon, the knowledge base selector is represented by a file folder icon,the templates selector is represented by a document icon, and theprofile, change password, and sign out selectors are available byselecting a dropdown menu represented by a downward facing triangleicon.

Referring back to FIG. 7, if the “test cases” sub-menu item is selectedan interface similar to interfaces 600/800 is displayed, but showingtest cases, and allowing the user to add, edit, delete, copy, addlabels, and so forth, similarly as previously described with respect tothe “threats” sub-menu item. The threat agents, security requirements,code snippets, code reviews, components (already described with respectto interface 600 since the components interface is set as the defaultinterface when the “knowledge base” selector is selected), dataelements, roles, widgets, component types, attributes, and user sub-menuitems all have similar functionality and bring up similar interfaceswhen selected. Data elements, which represent data elements that may becaptured by any diagrammed system, application or process (such ascredit card numbers, billing addresses, pins, phone numbers, emailaddresses, order history, birth date, medical history, insurancehistory, and so forth) may be associated with specific threats and withspecific security requirements in the same way as those associations maybe made for components.

If a user selects the security requirements sub-menu item an interfacesimilar to interfaces 600/800 will be shown similar to interface 900 ofFIG. 9, which allows the user to order security requirementsalphabetically (or reverse) by name or label and search for specificsecurity requirements. Selecting any security requirement will highlightit and display its name, description, labels, an indicator to indicatewhether the security requirement is a compensating control, and any codesnippets or code reviews (under a “properties” header) that have beenassociated with the security requirement (which may be added or removedfrom that interface similar to what is described with respect to the“properties” elements of interfaces 600/800).

Interface 900 is actually the interface visible when the user selectsthe “new” selector to create a new security requirement. From thiswindow the user may add a name, add a description, check a box (or leaveit blank) to indicate whether the security requirement is a compensatingcontrol, add any labels (which are previously input into the database bythe user), and press cancel to abort the addition or press save to writethe data to the database.

From any of the previously mentioned interfaces, if the user presses thehome selector an interface similar to interface 1300 of FIG. 13 will bedisplayed, which lists all previously stored threat models by name andshowing their version. Either column may be organized alphabetically orin reverse, and the PDF button will export the list to PDF. If anyspecific threat model is selected it will be highlighted and itsassociated threat report (threat report interface) 1302 will bedisplayed, which will be discussed hereafter. From the top menu itemsthe user may select the new selector to create a new threat model, theedit selector to edit the name, version, risk level, an “internal”toggle, and labels associated with the selected threat model, a deleteselector to delete the selected threat model, a diagram selector to viewthe diagram for the selected threat model, a report selector to exportto PDF the threat report (which shows for each threat the threat name,source, risk level, status, and creation date), a threat tree selectorto view a diagrammed threat tree, showing threats of the threat model,and other selectors already described.

If the threat tree selector is selected a threat tree is displayed inwhich threats are organized as sub-elements of data elements and/orcomponents, and also displayed are mitigating security requirements orcompensating controls that may be implemented to mitigate the threatsand an indicator of whether each threat has been mitigated. Portions ofthe tree may be collapsed, expanded, or viewed in vertical tree orhorizontal tree format. The interface showing the tree diagram hasselectors to zoom in, zoom out, revert to 100% zoom, toggle on/off athumbnail overview image in a corner of the display, save an image ofthe tree, open a legends window which shows the colors in which variouselements are diagrammed (threat agent, widget, component, role, dataelement, security requirement, threat, protocol, node, and project), anda filter selector which allows the user to remove and add back in any ofthe aforementioned items from the tree. The tree may be dragged andmoved in any direction for viewing any portion of it easier.

Continuing with FIG. 13, if the new selector is selected (which, as withall other selectors, could be implemented as an icon or logo absent anywording), a popup window appears allowing the user to enter a name,version, toggle an “internal” indicator, select a risk level from adropdown (from among previously determined risk levels stored in thedatabase), apply labels (which allow the user to type and populate alist of already entered labels stored in the database to select one, orto add a new label by typing a new item and selecting “add new”), or theuser may select a “new from template” button to begin a new diagram froman existing diagram template, or a “new from features” button to begin anew diagram from user-selected features, or the user may select “import”to begin a diagram from a previously stored diagram (such as from anolder version of the software), or the user may select “empty” to begina diagram with a blank canvas.

If the user selects “new from features” the diagram interface of FIG. 15displays with a blank canvas 1002, and a popup selector (not shown)allowing the user to select “business requirement” features which aredesired to be included in the model such as, by non-limiting example,authentication, funds transfer, credit verification, bill pay, or otherfeatures already stored in the database previously by the user, andafter selecting the desired features, the blank canvas will populatewith a node for each feature. The user can then modify and/or addcomponents to the diagram as desired. In implementations each of theseadded “business requirements” will add a “component group” to thediagram and threat model, as will be described hereafter.

If the user selects “empty” the diagram interface (interface) 1000 ofFIG. 15 will appear, showing the blank canvas 1002 as shown. To the leftof the canvas is a toolbox module which may be minimized using the leftfacing double arrows and re-expanded by selecting the same arrows whichwill then be right facing. To the right of the canvas is a propertiesmodule which also may be minimized and expanded in similar fashion,along with sub-menu items “general,” “components,” “data elements,”“roles,” and “widgets” each of which may be expanded downward orminimized upward using the double arrows (in FIG. 15 they are allminimized).

The toolbox module is searchable, with the user able to begin typing andthe system suggesting through a list populated just below the search boxcomponents which begin with the letters (or include the letters) typedby the user. The dropdown to the right of the search box may be used toallow the user to search from among all components or a subset such asone or more specific component libraries as previously discussed, withThreatModeler being an example component library) and/or one or morespecific component types as stored in the database (and previouslydiscussed with respect to FIG. 6). The user may also scroll down throughthe components using the scrollbar function.

In the example of FIG. 10 the components in the toolbox are of varyingsizes, but in implementations they may all be of similar sizes andshapes (or identical sizes and shapes). In implementations in which thesystem is deployed within a single organization with only a locallibrary of components the components listed in the toolbox will be thosethat have been input by the user or that were previously loaded into thedatabase during software installation. In implementations in which thesystem includes some remote communication with other libraries thetoolbox may display components available from other parties, such asthrough a cloud computing services, e.g., MICROSOFT AZURE or the like(in implementations the entire system and methods could be implementedusing cloud computing in instances where a local software installationor local database are not desired).

The toolbox, as can be seen, includes components that were previouslyentered into the database through interface 600 as previously described.From interface 1000 the user may select a desired component and drag itto a desired location on the canvas, and by dragging multiple items theuser may begin to add the components of a system, application or processto be modeled. By non-limiting example, FIG. 10 shows interface 10 witha relational diagram (diagram) 1004 already fully created by the user.As can be seen, the user has dragged multiple components onto the canvas1002 and has defined various relationships between them. The userdragging components to the canvas is one way in which the user selectsrelevant components or relevant sources as described with respect toFIG. 2, and it is from these relevant components (relevant sources) thatthe system identifies relevant threats by identifying the threats thatare associated through the database with those components.

In implementations a communication protocol (protocol) can be definedbetween components by clicking on a component and dragging the cursor toa second component. This will create an arrow, such as those shown onFIG. 10 between components on the canvas, and will display a defaultprotocol (here the default protocol is HTTPS), but a user may rightclick the arrow to display a popup selector allowing the user todeselect HTTPS and/or select one or more other protocols (such as TCP,SMB, WiFi, 3G, 4G, AJAX, binary, BLUETOOTH, FTP, FTPS, HTTP, IMAP,MAPIRPC, SMTP, SMTPS, USB, etc.), and when any protocol is selected thatprotocol name will be displayed (or if multiple are selected then“multiple” or some term/icon meaning “multiple” will be displayed—in theimage this is shown as “MULT” for short)—these protocol arrows will alsobe color coded by type (such as green for HTTPS, red for multiple, andso forth). Protocol arrows may also be deleted as desired. Thealphanumeric descriptions are shown here next to the link arrows, but inimplementations the wording may be superimposed over the link arrows.They are shown here next to the arrows for easier readability.

The components displayed in the toolbox of FIG. 10 are generally shownwithout icons. The USB Port, SSO (single sign on), BLUETOOTH PORT, andBLUETOOTH PROXY components are shown with icons as an example that allcomponents may be shown in the toolbox with an icon if desired. It mayalso be seen that the user may input components that constitute brandedsoftware elements, such as PAY PAL, AKAMAI DNS, SKYPE, etc. Inimplementations all compensating controls will be displayed in thetoolbox with a similar icon, such as the padlock icon shown for the SSOcomponent of FIG. 10.

As a user adds components and links them together, the threat modelincludes the threats that are associated with the components/protocols.As previously described, each component, each protocol, and each dataelement may be directly associated with one or more threats through thedatabase. Accordingly, each time a component is added to the diagram, ora new link drawn between components and protocol selected, if there areany threats associated through the database with the component and/orprotocol those threats are then included in the threat model. A user mayat any time right click on a blank area of the canvas when nocomponent/link is selected and a “threat report” item will be selectablewhich, when clicked, will generate a popup threat which will include alist of all threats. In implementations this will look much like thethreat report 1302 shown in FIG. 13, and will include a first “threats”tab list of all threats (and the number of threats), identifying therisk level of each threat, showing the threat status (open/mitigated),identifying the source of the threat (which is a component on thediagram), and having an actions column from which the user may display adescription of the threat (previously associated with the threat throughthe database) (the description selector here shown with the letter “D”though the selector could instead show “description” or the like) andleave a comment to store to the database (the comment selector havingthe phrase “note” though in other implementations it could say “notes”or “comment” or the like). The user may organize the table by any column(alphabetically or reverse) and may also organize by column headers bydragging the column headers to the location indicated. For example, theuser could drag the “status” header to the identified location and thendrag the “risk” header to the right of it and the table would then beorganized first by status and then by risk level. When this “dragging”is done a “ghost header” is dragged up to the identified location in thesense that the existing header remains in place. The organization may bereverted to an earlier state by deleting the ghost headers using an “x”icon.

The threat report displayed also includes a security requirement tab(showing number of security requirements) and displaying a table similarto the threats table. The security requirements table lists the securityrequirements that are associated with one or more of the identifiedthreats in one column, lists a source in another column (which is thecomponent associated with the threat), includes an “implemented” columnindicating whether the security requirement has been implemented, an“optional” column indicating whether the security requirement isoptional, and a similar “actions” column to the previously describedactions column, this time the description giving a description of thesecurity requirement and allowing the user to record a written note.This table may be organized similar to the previously described table.

With respect to the “implemented” column, in implementations this is acheckbox for each security requirement indicating whether the securityrequirement has been implemented. The user may manually check thosesecurity requirements that have been implemented and manually uncheckthose that have not. This column may also have been previously populatedwith some “implemented” checkmarks based on mitigations that the userhas selected for specific compensating controls, which will be discussedlater with respect to FIG. 11. Further, the “optional” column may alsoinclude checkboxes which a user may manually toggle to indicate whichsecurity requirements are optional or not. This column also may bepopulated by the user selecting certain mitigations as will later bediscussed with respect to FIG. 11—for example if there are two securityrequirements associated through the database with a specific threat, butonly one needs to be implemented, then if the user selects one of thosesecurity measures as mitigating the threat the other security measuremay populate on this list as being checked “optional.”

The threat report further includes a “test cases” tab (showing thenumber of test cases) and displays a table listing test cases associatedwith the threats through the database. As previously described withrespect to FIG. 8, each threat may have test cases associated with it.An example test case would be, for example, a “dictionary-based passwordattack” for a password-related threat. The test case tab would list thistest case and have an “actions” column which, when an icon is selected,pops up a description, which in this case states “use a passwordcracking tool what will leverage the dictionary to feed passwords to thesystem and see if they work” and further list techniques like settingthe test to try all words in the dictionary, common misspellings, andcombinations of words and common misspellings of combinations. The testcase tab/table thus offers tests that the user may try to test againstthe threats both before and after security requirements are implemented.This table may be organized and sorted similar to the previouslydescribed tables.

The threat report further includes a “code reviews” tab (showing thenumber of code reviews) and displays a table listing the code reviewsthat are associated with the security requirements through the database(as previously shown with respect to FIG. 9). An example code reviewwould be, for example, an “Authentication: Weak Password” code review.The code review table would list this code review and have an “actions”column which, when an icon is selected, pops up a description, which inthis case states “Password strength should be enforced upon a usersetting/selecting one's password” and gives examples of code that may beused to set up such an enforcement. The code review tab thus offerssample code that the user may use to implement measures against threatswhich may complement or work together with implemented securityrequirements. This table may be organized and sorted similar to thepreviously described tables.

Multiple selectors are shown at the top of interface 1000 in addition tothe permanent selectors that are available on several interfaces. The“select all” selector selects all components on the canvas (the user maythen deselect some, if desired, for example for grouping some or all thecomponents as later described). The “copy” selector copies selectedcomponents and the “paste” selector pastes the copy onto the canvas(this may also be done with keyboard shortcuts, and shortcuts may inimplementations be used for all other selectors described herein forsystem 100). The “delete” selector deletes the selected components fromthe canvas and the “clear canvas” selector deletes all components fromthe canvas. The “zoom in” and “zoom out” and “100%” zoom in and out ofthe canvas and revert to a 100% zoom, respectively. The “comment”selector populates an empty comment box on the canvas in which the usermay type a comment which will remain on the canvas until later removed(though it may appear in minimized or icon format until hovered over oropened). The “overview” selector displays a thumbnail overview of theentire diagram in a corner of the canvas.

The “undo” selector undoes the last action (or multiple last actions ifselected multiple times) and the “redo” selector does the opposite. Theleftmost “templates” selector pops up a menu from which one or morepreviously saved business requirement “features” may be selected to addto the canvas (these may be nodes and/or component groups, for example,and may be the same nodes/component groups that are described above whenthe user uses the “new from features” function when generating a newmodel). The “save as image” selector has a dropdown and allows the userto save an image of the diagram as then displayed in one of variousformats such as PNG, SVG, etc., or to take a “snapshot” which saves thediagram at the present state to the database. The “PDF” selectorgenerates a PDF of the threat report based on the current configurationof the diagram components (the threat report described to some extentabove). The “settings” dropdown selector allows the user to togglebetween straight or curved link lines (protocol lines/arrows), showingor hiding the link wording (in FIG. 10 the lines are curved and the linkwording is shown), making the diagram public or non-public, and showingor hiding comments (the comment function described above).

The “save as template” selector allows a user to save the entire diagramas either a threat model or a business requirement “feature” (in otherwords saving it as a component group) and in either case the user maygive the feature a name, add labels, and select the type as eitherthreat model or business requirement, then press cancel to cancel orsave to store the new template to the database. The “snapshots” selectorpopulates a list of previously saved snapshots, any one of which may beopened from the list or deleted.

The “group” and “ungroup” selectors allow the user to create a groupcontaining multiple components or to delete a group (but not theincluded components). As seen in FIG. 10 for example, there is a“WINDOWS 7” group which includes file system, PDF client, SKYPE, OUTLOOK2010, MCAFEE HIPS, MCAFEE AV VSE, IE11, BIT LOCKER, MCAFEE DLP, andOFFICE 2010 components. There is also a Laptop group containing theWINDOWS 7 group and further containing WiFi port, USB port, ethernetport, HDMI port, and BLUETHOOTH port components. Finally, there is anOffice Network group which includes the Laptop group and also includesfile server, SHAREPOINT, printer, WiFi access point, IRONPORT, emailserver, BLUECOAT proxy, and SSO (single sign on) components. Then thereare other components (external email gateway, AKAMAI DNS) which are notpart of any group. A group may be formed from any one or morecomponents, and the AZURE group is seen containing only a singlecomponent: ONEDRIVE.

When a group is formed the user may, using the right-side “general”dropdown, add a custom display name, select a container type (fromcontainer, trust boundary, collection, or some other option stored inthe database previously by the user), select a component (for examplefor the WINDOWS 7 the component “WINDOWS machine” is selected, whichshows that some components stored in the database may include othercomponents), select other display choices such as title andbackground/border color, and select a Common Platform Enumeration (CPE)identification from among a list previously stored in the database (forexample in this case ID a version of WINDOWS 7 is selected) (the list ofCPE IDs may be searched using filters to easily find the appropriateone), and the user may also add notes.

As further examples, the WINDOWS 7 group is identified as a containergroup, a WINDOWS machine, and a specific WINDOWS 7 operating systemversion is identified. The Laptop group shown in FIG. 10 is listed as acontainer group and no CPE ID is selected. The Office Network group isidentified as a trust boundary group type and no CPE ID is selectable.The AZURE group is identified as a trust boundary group type and no CPEID is selectable.

Each grouping of components, however, could be diagrammed separately asan independent threat model and then saved as a component so that it maybe imported into another threat model/diagram. When a user adds any ofthese component groups to a blank or existing diagram/threat model thethreat model of the component group is added to (and/or nested within)the threat model of the existing diagram/threat model. In this way theuser can modify a threat model by incorporating previously definedthreat models. This ability is generally termed “threat model chaining”herein and is a useful mechanism for allowing a user to diagram complexsystems/processes without having to repeatedly build common elementsamong the systems/processes.

Each component group may thus be redefined as a discrete “component” andmay then be included as a single icon in the toolbox menu. Bynon-limiting example, referring to FIG. 10, the WINDOWS 7 componentgroup could be defined as a component, then the user could, in anotherdiagram (or the same diagram), select and add a WINDOWS 7 component tothe diagram to import into the diagram and associated threat model thethreats associated with the WINDOWS 7 threat model. That same could bedone for the LAPTOP component group. Accordingly, a component group andassociated threats added to a diagram may in turn already include othernested/chained threat models therein, so for example if a user defined alaptop component group such as that in FIG. 10 as a “WINDOWS LAPTOP”component then, when a user later adds a WINDOWS LAPTOP element to adiagram/threat model by selecting a WINDOWS LAPTOP component from thetoolbox and dragging it onto the diagram, the threats associated withthe laptop itself, as well as the nested/chained threats associated withthe included WINDOWS 7 threat model, are automatically included in thethreat model for the then displayed diagram.

Referring back to FIG. 10, the “compensating controls” selector may beselected to display a popup similar to compensating control report(report) 1200 of FIG. 12. This report is populated from previousrelations stored in the relational database. As indicated previouslywith respect to FIG. 6, each component may be associated with one ormore threats and one or more security requirements through the databaseusing interface 600, and as described with respect to FIG. 8 each threatmay be associated with one or more security requirements through thedatabase. As further indicated with respect to FIG. 9, each securityrequirement may be identified through the database as a compensatingcontrol. Accordingly, based on these relationships and selections thelist populated in FIG. 12 shows all possible compensating controls thatcould be implemented to mitigate threats that are present in thediagrammed system, application or process.

By non-limiting example, the threat of “physical theft” is associatedwith the component “laptop” through the database, but no securityrequirements are directly associated with the laptop component.Nevertheless, the “physical theft” threat is associated with thesecurity requirements “MCAFEE FRP” and “BITLOCKER” through the database,both of which security requirements are identified through the databaseas compensating controls (MCAFEE FRP being a USB encryption tool andBITLOCKER being a disk encryption tool). Accordingly, when a user addsthe laptop component to a diagram, if the user selects the “compensatingcontrols” selector this list will then include both MCAFEE FRP andBITLOCKER as compensating controls for the physical theft threat. If theuser removes the laptop component from the diagram (deletes it) then theMCAFEE FRP and BITLOCKER compensating controls will no longer appear inthe list (unless they are also associated as compensating controls forsome other threat present in the diagram). In implementations the listpopulated will also show compensating controls which are directlyassociated with a component that is added to the diagram. In otherwords, in the above example there are no security requirements directlyassociated with the laptop component, but if a third securityrequirement were directly associated with the component throughinterface 600, and if the third security requirement was identifiedthrough the database as a compensating control, then that thirdcompensating control would also populate in the list of interface 1200.

Referring again to FIG. 10, it may be seen that this diagram includesthe MCAFEE DLP, BITLOCKER, MCAFEE HIPS, and MCAFEE AV VSE componentsgrouped in the WINDOWS 7 group. The user may, for example have modeledthe WINDOWS 7 group, then used the compensating controls selector at thetop of interface 1000 to identify that there are certain threats thatthese components would mitigate. The user may then add those componentsto the WINDOWS 7 group by dragging them from the toolbox to a locationwithin the group outline to add them to that group. Then, upon rightclicking on any specific security requirement component, the user mayselect a “mitigations” selector which pops up mitigations interface(interface) 1100 as shown in FIG. 11. The user could add one of thesecomponents at a time and model the mitigations, generate a new threatreport, then either remove that component or add another compensatingcontrol, and in this way test out various compensating controls. This isone way in which the system facilitates steps 512, 514, 516, 518, 520,and 522, among other steps, of FIG. 5.

Interface 1100 displays a table which lists all threats and theirassociated sources (component associated with the threat), risk levels,and status, and highlights the listed threats which the securityrequirement is configured to mitigate as identified previously throughthe database through interface 800 (these threats are “mitigatable” bythe selected security requirement). The user may deselect highlightedthreats and/or may highlight other threats, then may select “close” tocancel or may select “mitigate” to toggle those threats to mitigatedthrough the database. Once this is done, for example, the threat reportas seen in FIG. 13 (or popup shown from the diagram interface) will listthe mitigated threats as “mitigated” and the compensating controls listshown in FIG. 12 will also show the mitigated risks as mitigated.

The threat report of FIG. 13 allows a user to manually change the risklevel and threat status directly from the home menu using the “changerisk” and “change threat status” drop downs once a threat is selected byclicking on any row. Changing the risk level of a threat from thisinterface will only change the risk level for this specific threatmodel. Threat statuses that may be used include, by non-limitingexamples: open, closed, mitigated, fixed, not applicable, needs moredetails, not tested, secure usage practice, and so forth.

The systems and methods described herein may also be used for analyzingan attack surface of a complex system or process, which will bedescribed now. In implementations the attack surface of a system orprocess is comprised of the sum of all open and unmitigated potentialthreats to an “asset” identified through threat modeling.

As described herein, a modeled system or process may include a modeleddeployed or contemplated computing network, which could include bynon-limiting example: one or more applications; one or more on-premisesinfrastructures; one or more cloud-based infrastructures; one or morehybrid infrastructures; serverless architectures; microservices; one ormore embedded devices; one or more IoT devices; one or more mobiledevices; one or more Industrial Control Systems (ICS); one or morecyber-physical systems (CPS); one or more third party systems; one ormore organizational networks or intranets; non-cyber elementsinteracting with a cyber system such as, by non-limiting exampletangible assets, intangible assets, property(ies), plant(s), equipment,liquid assets, brands, reputation, residential structures, realproperty, utility services, unattached removable items and assets; aninfrastructure system, such as a transportation infrastructure, anelectrical grid, a telecommunications network, and so forth, all inimplementations accessible and utilized through a highly interconnectednetwork of intranets, wireless networks, and the Internet.

All such components of a modeled process or system may include potentialthreats which, if discovered and exploited by an adversary, may yieldone or more attack vectors to one or more assets of the system orprocess. The “asset” may be any item selected by a user to be identifiedas an asset. The modeled “attackers” included in any threat model may beactually modeled as a person in implementations, though in otherimplementations may be simply modeled as an entry point or deviceincluded in the process or system which an attacking person may use tocause harm.

It may be pointed out that increased interconnectivity of a computingsystem with other systems (such as the Internet, third party systems,end user systems, etc.) may increase economic value and efficiencythough these may also increase organizational risk due to the increasein adversarial actors and a constantly evolving threat landscape. Thethreat modeling chaining and attack simulation systems and methodsdescribed herein allow organizations to manage threats at acomprehensive organizational level notwithstanding an ever-changingthreat landscape.

A modeled “attack” as used herein is a modeled attempt by an adversarialentity to traverse the modeled system or process from an attack surfaceto one or more assets within the system or process. The routes from allpotential attackers to a selected asset are the “attack vectors” orattack paths to that asset.

Referring now to FIG. 14, a block flow diagram illustrates steps thatmay be included in a general attack surface analysis. Step 1402 includesuser generation of a diagram of a system or process, as has beendescribed previously with respect to FIG. 10. Step 1404 includes systemgeneration of a threat report for each component or component group andstep 1406 includes system combination of the individual threat reportsinto a comprehensive threat report for the overall diagrammedsystem/process (this would include, for example, including threat reportelements for nested or chained threat models, as has been explainedabove), and then steps 1408-1414 include steps which may occur in anyorder. In step 1408, once a user has selected an asset to analyze, thesystem summarizes data to show all attack vectors associated withthreats which may compromise that asset. At step 1410 the user analyzesthe various attack vectors to determine what compensating controls maybe included to protect the asset. At step 1412 the user adds or removescompensating controls to the diagram and/or toggles compensatingcontrols between ON/OFF states. At step 1414 the user determines theeffectiveness of the compensating controls or other risk managementmethods (such as changing communication protocols, changing the relativelocation of the asset within the modeled environment, addingnon-compensating control elements between the asset and attacklocations, and so forth).

FIG. 16 further breaks down step 1402. At step 1602 the user identifiesthe components of the system or process and chooses their relativeplacement within the diagram, at step 1604 the user identifies the typeand placement of any communication protocols between components, and atstep 1606 any other attributes of components (including protocols) maybe further designated (this step may be excluded in some methods, andthese steps may be done in any order in implementations).

FIG. 17 shows a tree diagram that representatively illustrates a methodof determining an attack vector for a selected asset. After a system orprocess is modeled using the diagram interface, described above, then inthe diagram interface or in another interface either an asset isselected or an associated component is selected and relevant threatattack paths illustrated. For example, in the topmost node of FIG. 17 anasset 1702 is shown, and the attack tree or threat tree shows that theasset is associated through the database with four components.Components 1704, 1706, 1708, and 1710 are each associated with threats(i.e., the threats that are associated with each component through thedatabase). Accordingly, threats 1712, 1714, 1716, 1718, 1720, 1722, and1724 are shown. It may be seen that the system then determines thatthreat 1722, through component 1708, is a threat to asset 1702, and thusattack vector 1726 (shown by lines of heavier weight) is shown betweenthreat 1722 to asset 1702. The diagram of FIG. 17 may be shown on aninterface of the system, though in implementations FIG. 17 simply modelsthe method the system is utilizing behind the scenes to show the attackvector(s) in the diagram interface, as in some implementations (such asthose shown in the drawings) the threats are not explicitly shown on thediagram interface(s). FIG. 17 shows an attack vector by which anadversarial entity may target the asset, i.e., by exploiting threat 1722of component 1708. It should be noted that the asset may be somesub-component within a diagrammed component, or it may be some elementthat is somehow associated with the component (for example the componentmay be a database, and the asset may be sensitive client informationstored within the database—in that instance the asset could be definedbroadly as the database, or it could be defined narrowly as thesensitive information within the database, other information in thedatabase not being included in the definition).

It is noted that each asset could have any number of threats that couldthreaten to compromise it. Accordingly, the system identifies allthreats which may compromise the asset in order to visually diagramattack vectors for the user. Some assets may be threatened by only asingle threat, some may be threatened by two or three threats, or more,and so forth. Along these same lines, it is pointed out (as has beendiscussed to some extent above) that each individual component (orgrouped set of components) of a threat model could, itself, beassociated with its own threat model through the database. Because ofthis, the overall threat model that is shown (for instance in FIG. 13)in implementations could be called a threat model portfolio as itincludes all sub-threat models and nested threat models. For example, anoverall threat model A could include components B, C, and D. Component Bcould be a single component, component C could be a previously modeledgroup of components having its own threat model, and component D couldbe a previously modeled group of components having its own threat modelthat also includes therein a nested threat model for a component groupE. Accordingly, the threat model A would include all threat modelsassociated with components and component groups B, C, D, and E,including all nested threat models. As described above, this “threatmodel chaining” may allow for quick and simple building ofprocess/system models without having to recreate commonly includedsystem/process elements.

In implementations one or more interfaces of system 100 may be utilizedto list the top potential threats (such as the top ten potentialthreats), the top most vulnerable components, the composition of threatsby risk type, the composition of threats by status (mitigated,unmitigated, open, etc.), and so forth. The data may of course beorganized and displayed in many other ways. In implementations aninterface could list each threat, list each threat risk level, and listthe source(s) for each threat. In implementations each threat sourcelisting may include a component and an underlying source, so for exampleone component may be associated with multiple sources of a threat. Anexample would be an online banking interface which is shown on adiagrammed threat model as a component, and a threat may be a virusbeing introduced to the bank's environment through a breach in thebanking interface, and one source of the threat may be a legitimate userwho unwarily exposes the ATM to a virus on his/her computer, and anothersource of the threat may be an individual hacker seeking to introducethe virus to the banking environment, and another source of the threatmay be a state-sponsored entity with high end mechanisms to seek tointroduce the virus to the banking environment.

In implementations an interface of the system may list the mostvulnerable components in ascending/descending order, along with the risklevel for each listed component, the number of total threats to thatcomponent, and the number of open or unmitigated threats for thatcomponent. In implementations an interface of the system may listmultiple data elements associated with components (for example usernames, social security numbers, financial info, credit card numbers,employee ages, etc.) (in this case the component likely being a databasehousing the data), a data classification for each data element (such asconfidential, restricted, public, etc.) and an exposure level for eachdata element (such as very high, high, low, etc.). In implementations aninterface of the system may break down the risk levels by percentage,such as 45% very high risks, 25% high risks, 15% medium risks, and soforth. In implementations an interface of the system may break down riskstatus by percentage, such as 45% open threats, 25% closed threats, 30%mitigated threats, etc. In implementations an interface of the systemmay visually illustrate the number of threat introductions plottedversus time, such as the number of threat introductions by month.

Any of the interfaces discussed herein may, as would be expected, change(and in implementations may change dynamically) as edits are made to thediagram (for example when a compensating control is toggled betweenON/OFF states, this may change many or all of the interface displaysaccordingly by varying percentages, mitigating threats, etc. Thus when acompensating control is introduced and/or turned on or off, the threatmodel, threat report, mitigations interface, compensating controlreport, and so forth may all change accordingly to reflect the updatedconfiguration.

It is pointed out that any threat model of the system may be subjectedto an attack vector analysis. So, for example, an attack vector analysismay be performed on a simple two-component diagram, or an attack vectoranalysis may be performed on a hundred-component diagram that includesthe two-component diagram as a nested sub-threat model.

In implementations an interface of the system may show a display similarto FIG. 17 except mapping all components/assets vulnerable from a singlethreat. In other implementations an interface of the system may show adisplay of all threats affecting a single component or asset. In thelatter case the visual display may show attack vectors branchingoutwards from the asset, tracing communication protocols and extendingthrough multiple components as far back as the locations/sources of theunderlying threats. This is representatively illustrated in FIG. 18,which shows a type of display that may be shown on an interface of thesystem.

FIG. 18 shows components A-G. Component A has been selected as an asset,and the attack vectors of all threats threatening the asset (componentA) are diagrammed using arrows. The arrows in FIG. 18 are shown indifferent formats so that they can be distinguished from one another. Inother implementations they may all have the same appearance. The arrowsare also shown pointing away from the asset, but in otherimplementations this may be reversed so that arrows point towards theasset from the underlying threats. It may be seen that a threatemanating from component G threatens to compromise component A (or theasset within or associated with component A), the attack vector 1802passing through component F and component B to reach component A. Athreat emanating from component E also threatens to compromise componentA, the attack vector 1806 passing through component B to reach componentA. A threat emanating from component D also threatens to compromise theasset, the attack vector 1804 passing through component C and componentB to reach component A.

The attack vector displays may be modified based on contemplatedcompensating controls. FIG. 19, for example, shows the diagram of FIG.18 but modified to include six compensating controls (each labeled“CC”). These compensating controls may mitigate different threatsemanating from different components. Compensating control 3 (CC3) maymitigate one or more threats from component D. CC2 may mitigate one ormore threats from components C and/or D. CC5 and CC6 may each mitigateone or more threats from component E. CC4 may mitigate one or morethreats from components F and/or G. CC1 may mitigate one or more threatsfrom components B, C, D, E, F, and/or G. Using such a modeled attackvector diagram, the user may be able to alter compensating controls andmake decisions about where in the system to deploy compensatingcontrols. The user may determine, for example, that CC1 may mitigatemany threats more efficiently than several compensating controlsdeployed elsewhere in the system. Or it may be determined that the assetis better protected by some other combination of compensating controls.

The elimination of any threat of course protects downstream components.Accordingly, for example, if CC3 eliminates or mitigates one threatemanating from component D, then the downstream effects of that threatto components C, B, and A are all mitigated. On the other hand, if CC1eliminates or mitigates the same threat, it would only eliminate ormitigate the threat for component A, not for components B or C.Accordingly, there are security advantages to having compensatingcontrols further upstream.

Changing the compensating controls in such a diagram could also changethe other displays on other interfaces, for example the listing of topthreats, listing of top ten most vulnerable components, other top tenlistings, composition of threats by risk, composition of threats bystatus, composition of threats by source, composition of threats byother criteria, the overall threat model, the mitigations interface, thecompensating control report, and so forth. This dynamic change of allinterfaces allows the user to do “what if” analyses by adding/removingany compensating control and/or toggling any compensating controlbetween ON/OFF states and then seeing how all the aforementioneddisplays/reports etc. change accordingly. The change may, for example,illustrate one or more threats as mitigated or closed instead of open orunmitigated, reduce the total number of open or unmitigated threats,reduce exposure levels of data elements, alter the percentages ofthreats by risk level (very high, high, medium, low, very low, etc.),alter the percentages of threats by status (open, closed, unmitigated,mitigated), or the reverse of all these, on any of the interfaces orreports of the system.

The term “asset” as it is used herein may refer to anything that hasvalue to a user or organization, and therefore requires securitymeasures to protect it from theft, manipulation, destruction,compromise, or other forms of abuse. Attackers are an active populationof computer environment users and vary in the skills, toolsets,opportunities, financial backing, and other attributes required for asuccessful attack on an asset. Most security measures to protect acomputer system-related asset may be categorized into one of twocategories: (1) defensive and/or monitoring mechanisms to inhibitattacks in progress or mitigate the effects thereafter, and; (2)reducing the number of potential threats through which attacks may beinitiated to begin with. The latter can in many cases be less costlyoverall, and the ability of the systems and methods described herein totest and retest various configurations, including modeling the use ofcompensating controls, allows users to focus efforts on this method.

In implementations threat modeling and/or attack simulation methods mayinclude the following steps: (1) generally defining a threat model(including model type, outputs to be generated, and overall objectivesfor different stakeholders); (2) visually diagramming a system/processusing database-stored components (including communication protocols andcompensating controls); (3) classifying one or more data elements withina component (or associated with a component), and/or one or morecomponents themselves, as assets; (4) identifying and enumeratingpotential threats to the assets based on the diagrammed components; (5)analyzing the identified threats (threat analysis); (6) identifying andanalyzing potential attackers based on the threat analysis; (7) analyzethe effectiveness of deployed or contemplated compensating controls tomitigate the potential threats; (8) analyze a threat model and attacksurface as modified by compensating controls; and (9) measure andquantify the effectiveness of the model and/or method relative to thedesired outputs and objectives previously determined. This is just oneexample of steps included in such methods, and other methods may excludesome of these steps, or include other steps, and so forth. In animplementation of the above steps, step (6) interrupts step (5), and inan alternative implementation step (5) is allowed to be completedwithout interruption. Furthermore, in implementations steps (7) and (8)may be iteratively bounced between during any given implementation, sothat a user adds a compensating control then checks the outcome, togglesthe configuration of the compensating control then checks the outcome,removes a compensating control then checks the outcome, moves acompensating control to a new location then checks the outcome, etc.,before moving to step (9).

Referring to step (1), different stakeholders may have different threatmodel output needs, so different model types can be built using system100 and the methods described herein. For example, software applicationdevelopers, operations teams, embedded system teams, IoT device teams,cloud deployment and architecture teams, ICS system or cyber-relatedsystem teams, and so forth, may create different threat model types.Architects may model threats to a residential structure, structuralengineers may model threats to occupants, neighborhood planners maymodel supporting infrastructures needed for developments, and so forth.Home decorators may model occupant flow and so determine the most secureplaces for expensive home décor. In non-computing systems/process thatare modeled, the protocols may represent things other than communicationfor example in the home décor example the protocols may representmethods of moving an occupant between rooms. In implementations a usermay select one of many model types to begin with (to populate the properpredefined components with which to diagram the model). This could beselecting, by example, from among examples such as the following:application threat model; operational threat model; cloud threat model;embedded threat model; IoT threat model; cyber-physical system threatmodel; and so forth. A user may still access all components in thediagram interface by searching for them but selecting the proper modelmay allow the most relevant components to populate at the top of thelist.

Still referring to step (1), a user may in implementations also selectrole-based threat model outputs (such as with yes/no selectors) such as:secure coding requirements; operational checklists; executive metrics;executive reporting; security metrics; security reporting, and so forth,and these may also affect the position of components within the toolboxlist on the diagram interface. In other implementations these selections(and the selections in the above paragraph) may only be used forrecord-keeping purposes. The input may also include the name of themodel, the version, the name of the model creator, the date created, theupdate person, the update date, comments, desired objectives bydevelopment/operations/security/executives/business leaders, and others,and notes or toggle elements to indicate whether those objectives aremet, in progress, or in some other state (and any or all of thesefeatures may be included on one or more of the already-describedinterfaces).

A representative example of the aforementioned step (3) is illustratedin FIG. 20, which may involve the classification of assets which may beassociated with, located nearby or relevant to, or utilized bydiagrammed components. In implementations the asset classification foreach asset includes: an asset class; an asset, and; an associatedcomponent. In implementations the asset classification may be used as aninput for analyzing potential attackers by providing insight to possiblepurposes attackers may have in targeting the asset. As an example, inimplementations of cybersecurity modeling the assets may be classifiedas: non-confidential data; confidential consumer data; confidentialcorporate data; system capabilities (such as electronic fundstransfers); non-digital assets (such as infrastructure or IT-systemcontrolled equipment, and so forth. In a residential security model theclassification could be: lightweight valuables; heavy weight valuables;personal information; life and health of occupants; residentialstructure/utilities; home security (entry keys/codes), etc.

Step (5) has already been described to some extent previously withrespect to FIG. 17 with the creation of an attack tree (a partial attacktree is shown in FIG. 17—a full attack tree would include all assets astopmost nodes, and in implementations the attack tree may be similar oridentical to the “threat tree” shown in FIG. 14 of the '021Application). Referring to FIG. 17, the attack vector connects the assetwith the component from which the threat emanates, and this associationwas determined by the previous classification step. In implementationsthe attack/threat tree may be simplified by only showing one topmostnode (one asset) and only its associated components and threats. Inimplementations the attack tree only shows three levels—the topmostlevel being the assets, the middle level being components, and thebottom level being threats. This model can be simplified further to haveonly two levels—the topmost level includes asset/component pairings, andthe bottom level shows the threats. In this simplified model the attacktree may show the asset identified as being nested within a component orotherwise attached or coupled with it (in implementations the topmostlevel would then show, for example, component 1 including asset 1 inlevel 1, component 2 including asset 1 in level 1, component 3 includingasset 1 in level 1, etc., with level two (the bottom level) showing thethreats coupled with the components). As a representative example, theasset could be jewelry, the components could be a front door, a backdoor, and a window, and a threat to the front door could be a bump-key,and since an attacker may use a bump-key to enter the front door, thebump-key is a threat to the asset.

Step (5) includes a second part, which is analyzing the identifiedthreats. In implementations this involves various stages. One stageincludes creating a profile for each threat. This may include utilizingreal-world threat intelligence to provide attributes to said threats,and the attributes may include defined technical means to exploit thethreat. A numerical value may be assigned to this means attribute (ahigh value indicating a higher level of technical means required toexploit the threat. This means attribute may also include the requisiteskill, toolset, social network, financial backing, etc. the attackingentity would need to utilize the threat and traverse the correspondingattack vector. As examples, the technical means for the aforementionedbump-key against the front door is relatively low, whereas the technicalmeans to alternatively burrow through the home's foundation to bypassother security controls is relatively high.

Another threat attribute is the access required to carry out the attack.A number is assigned to the access attribute, with a high numberindicating a higher required level of access. A low access attribute mayfor example be attached to a lower level employee's alphanumericpassword (which may be known by an immediate supervisor), while a highaccess attribute may be attached to biometric signatures for keypersonnel (which may require high access levels such as a privilegedsystem administrator).

Another threat attribute is a defensive distance, or number of securitycontrols and their effectiveness, between a threat and the asset. A highnumerical value indicates a greater number of effective securitymeasures in between. Another threat attribute is the potential impact ifthe threat is realized—a high value indicates a high technological orbusiness impact in the event the threat is realized.

The second stage involves analyzing the attacker population. Two methodsare disclosed herein. In one method (the preferred method), potentialattackers are analyzed based on the identified threats and identifiedassociated assets. The other method allows users to adopt existingthreat intelligence about known attackers who have utilized existingthreats (for example data of a 30% chance of a home invasion in anygiven year compared with a 1 in 20 million chance of a terrorist attackat the home). In the preferred method objective attributes andcharacteristics of attackers are provided even where such intelligenceis not known.

The third stage involves determining a likelihood of a threat beingrealized. When the above preferred method is utilized this includesthree sub steps of determining a subset of the attacker population withthe sufficient means, sufficient motivation, and sufficient opportunityto exploit the threat, to determine the probability of an attackersubset coming from the attacker population (this discards attackers whowould be unable to exploit the threat for whatever reason) (if the othermethod is used the statistically-provided probability is used). Adetermination is then made of whether the asset is attractive to theattacker, if not the likelihood of threat exploit is set to a minimumvalue, but if it is attractive the likelihood of threat exploit is theproduct of an attacker coming from the attacker population and the levelof attraction. The next step calculates the product of the impact shouldthe identified threats be realized and the likelihood of the threatsbeing realized for each threat. Each threat is then prioritizedaccording to some scheme (e.g., critical, high, moderate, etc.).

Step (6) involves analyzing attackers using means, motive, andopportunity (as identified above, in the preferred embodiment thisoccurs partway through step (5)—but if real world intelligence is usedthis step is obviated and skipped). If the attacker lacks eithersufficient means, or sufficient motivation, or sufficient opportunity toconduct an attack, the attacker is disregarded, whereas if the attackerhas all three the attacker is included in the organizational attackerpopulation. These determinations could be done, for example, by anyknown or discovered method to assign a meaningful and relevant value toeach category, and if the value of the attacker's technical means meetsor exceeds the above set technical means value (and similarly for amotivation value compared with the above identified access level valueand an opportunity value compared with the above identified defensivedistance value) then the attacker is included in the organizationalattacker population, otherwise not.

Step (7) has previously been described with respect to FIG. 5.

Step (8) includes reviewing the threat report after all of the abovesteps have been done. Step (9) involves comparing the outputs obtainedfrom the threat model and process relative to the desired outputs anddesired objectives indicated in step (1). In implementations steps (1)and (9) may be done through system interfaces. In other implementationsthey may simply be done manually. In still other implementations theymay both be excluded.

Referring now to FIG. 21, a representative example of attack simulationmethods is shown. FIG. 21 shows the methods illustrated using thediagram interface 1000, though in other implementations the methods maybe implemented using a separate interface that takes the componentsdiagrammed in any given threat model and displays them in a separateinterface just for the purpose of illustrating attack vectors. In FIG.21 it is to be understood that the user has previously identified,through the database, the ONE DRIVE element as an asset. In otherimplementations the asset could be linked to the ONE DRIVE component butcould be displayed as its own separate component—for example a “clientinfo database file” shown next to or within the ONE DRIVE component(though in such a case the “asset” itself would be a “component” as thatterm is used herein). In the shown implementation the ONE DRIVEcomponent itself is identified as the asset.

A number of dashed protocol lines are shown in FIG. 21. These are shownin this fashion after the user has selected the ONE DRIVE component andmade a selection to show all threats that could compromise thecomponent. For example, this could be done in implementations byright-clicking on the ONE DRIVE component and selecting a selector suchas “Show Attack Paths,” though the attack paths may be shown using othermethods that the practitioner of ordinary skill in the art maydetermine. Once the selection is made, all threats reaching the ONEDRIVE component are highlighted in some manner. In the representativeexample they are highlighted by showing dashed and “moving” arrows,meaning an animation which shows the dashed portions of the lines asmoving in one direction or another. In some implementations thisanimation could show the dashes moving in the direction towards theasset, which may assist the user to trace attack paths back to theoutermost threats. In other implementations the arrows could bereoriented when the attack paths are shown so that the arrow tips allpoint downstream towards the asset, which may also assist the user totrace attack paths back to outermost threats. In implementations theattack paths are shown in a different color and/or using a greater linethickness than other protocol lines. In implementations the attack pathsare shown in bright red and using thick lines while non-compromisedpaths are shown in thin black lines.

It can be seen that there are threats associated with the WIFI ACCESSPOINT and with the SHARE POINT components, and that these threats reachthe ONE DRIVE component through OFFICE 2010 and IE11 components. Thereare a number of potential compensating controls in the diagrammed systemwhich may be utilized to mitigate these threats. For example, the laptopcomponent group is shown including the MCAFEE HIPS, MCAFEE AV VSE, BITLOCKER, and MCAFEE DLP compensating controls, and there is also an SSOcompensating control diagrammed between the IE11 and ONE DRIVEcomponents. All compensating controls in this diagram are shown ashaving an icon of a padlock on them so that the user can easily view thecompensating controls to modify the threat model and the attacksimulation (the compensating controls in implementations do notintroduce any new threats but only mitigate threats).

Referring now to FIG. 22, in this screen the user has toggled the MCAFEEAV VSE and SSO elements to an ON configuration. In implementations thisis done by right-clicking each component and selecting “BLOCK” from amenu, which then changes all attack paths that are mitigatable by theselected compensating control to a mitigated display state (in someimplementations the user may be able to select which attack paths aremitigatable from this interface). In FIG. 22 these compensating controlsare highlighted by outlining them in a thicker line to show that theyare turned on (though this display may be excluded in otherimplementations). The attack paths that are mitigated by thecompensating controls that have been toggled to an ON state (or to ablocking state) are now shown as solid lines again, while those that arenot mitigated are still shown in dashed format. In implementations themitigated attack paths are shown in a thick green line. The user mayreselect the compensating controls and select unblock to revert thethreat model to the previous state. The user may also delete any givencompensating control from the diagram altogether, and this will have theeffect of changing any attack paths that were mitigated by thatcompensating control to an unmitigated display state.

While the mitigated display state for attack paths are described hereinas green and bold and the unmitigated display state for attack paths aredescribed as dashed, red, bold and animated, the practitioner ofordinary skill in the art could select other visual techniques todifferentiate attack paths from non-attack paths and mitigated attackpaths from non-mitigated attack paths. When a user toggles acompensating control to an ON state this may have the effect ofdynamically changing the threat report, the compensating control report,the mitigations interface, and so forth by toggling relevant threats tomitigated (and toggling the same compensating control to the OFF stateor removing it altogether from the diagram may have the oppositeeffect). In implementations one or more of the user interfaces (such asthose of FIGS. 21-22) may allow user selection of certain threat sourcesand deselection of others, so as to only show attack paths of threatsassociated with a selected subset of the diagrammed components. Thethreats are shown in FIGS. 21-22 as emanating from outermost components(and the system/method may default to checking for threats at alloutermost nodes), but in implementations they could emanate frominternal sources (such as a USB port in an internal system administratorcomputer being a threat source for a virus). An attacker could bevisually displayed at each threatened component, for example an“attacker” component could be placed on the diagram coupled with theWIFI ACCESS POINT and SHAREPOINT components to indicate the presence ofan attacker. In other implementations the attacker need not be displayedin this way, but the user may understand that an attacker is reachingfor the asset through the end points from where the threats are shownemanating on the diagram. From these end point components, or from anactual “attacker” component, the user may edit an attack profile (suchas to indicate along a spectrum from a low funded individual hacker allthe way to a state sponsored team of skilled and well-funded hackers)and this may modify the attack paths. For example, if the latter profileis identified then certain compensating controls may not mitigate thethreats (for example the SSO element may not be effective, and anothercompensating control would be needed instead), and accordingly when theprofile is changed one or more of the attack paths may change to amitigated or unmitigated display state in response. The identificationof hacker type may be done, for example, through dropdown lists,checkmark items, and so forth that had been previously set through thedatabase by the user, and the ability of a compensating control tomitigate threats by lower-end attackers but not higher-end attackers mayalso be defined/set through the database in the input interfacespreviously described (though using selectors not shown—but which thepractitioner of ordinary skill in the art will know how to implement).

In implementations another interface may allow the user to get a list ofall threats which may compromise the asset and all attack pathsassociated with those threats. The asset has been described above asbeing anything of value to the user, it could for example be a database,a financial asset, a trade secret (or files related to trade secrets),and so forth.

One more comment is made here with respect to threat model chaining. Theuser may select a sub-component or component group (for example the usercould right click the WINDOWS 7 component in FIG. 22) and select an“open in new window” selector to open a new diagram interface showingthe diagram just for that component group. The user may then view justthe threats associated with the component group, using previouslyidentified methods, and/or may identify assets within the componentgroup (for example OUTLOOK 2010) to show attack paths related just tothis component. In implementations a user may right click or otherwiseselect a component group on an existing threat model by selecting a boxoutlining the component group and then select a “show threats” or othermenu item to treat the entire component group as an asset and to showall attack paths thereto.

In implementations the designation of a component as an asset is done assimply as clicking on any component and selecting a “show threats” orsimilar menu item from a list. In other implementations a component maybe designated as an asset by another mechanism and/or using anotherinterface. The asset may be selected and its features edited, as well,as detailed to some extent above (for example some of the assetclassification may be done here, though this may alternatively be doneusing one or more other interfaces). The attack simulation systems andmethods herein allow a user to obtain a thorough understanding ofthreats and risks to multi-faceted systems/processes, and the impact torelevant assets, should potential threats be realized.

Although the examples of computing system models have been described indetail, system 100 may be utilized to model other threats. For example,referring to a disease epidemic threat model, the threats may be sourcesor ways the disease may spread, the security requirements may be methodsor elements to reduce the effects of those sources, such as sterilizingsurgery instruments, washing hands, using air filters, breathing masks,gloves, and the components may be steps or interactions that occur withrespect to persons who may be infected, such as admitting them, dealingwith infected clothing, performing medical operations on them, etc. Insuch a scenario the threat model may have no components, threats, orsecurity requirements that relate directly to computing devices orsystems, though the threat may be modeled on system 100 which utilizescomputing devices. The same may be said for the aforementioned threatmodel of commuting to work. Numerous other threat models, involving anyof myriad types of threats, could be modeled using system 100. Othertypes of threat models could include: modeling physical and technologythreats to airplanes, smart homes, smart TVs, an electric grid, and soforth.

Accordingly, the system and interfaces described herein allow a user tomodel a variety of systems, applications, and processes to determinethreats and to mitigate those threats. The user may, at any time, deleteany security requirement component (which may be a compensating controlcomponent) from a diagram and then generate the threat report again torevert to the threat statuses prior to mitigation by any particularcomponent. This is one way in which step 518 of FIG. 5 may beaccomplished, since removing the mitigating component will revert themitigated threats back to the open status (except for threats which arealso mitigated by another mitigating component). In implementationsthere may be other ways to “roll back” the threat report to an earlierstatus, such as with one or more selectors on the threat report itselfto revert to an earlier configuration, or one or more “back” selectorson the diagram interface, and so forth.

Utilizing the methods and systems described herein an organization orindividual can quickly and efficiently model deployed or contemplatedsystems, applications and/or processes and assess relevant threats todetermine a mitigation strategy. The user may assess new threats to theentire attack surface of a system, application or process as the newthreats arise and accordingly develop modified mitigation strategieswith minimal disruption to existing operations. Additionally, themethods and systems described herein allow users to study the ability ofa compensating control to block new or existing threats withoutpenetration testing (pen-testing), which can be resource-intensive,slow, and not as thorough as desired. The systems and methods also allowassessment of future compensating controls which have not yet beenimplemented (and accordingly where penetration testing is not yet anoption). Any of the threat modeling described herein may utilizeexisting threat modeling methodologies including STRIDE, P.A.S.T.A.,TRIKE, OCTAVE, and/or VAST methodologies, which may include modeling thesystem, application or process as a data flow diagram (DFD) or a processflow diagram (PFD). The methods and systems herein integrate well withagile and DevOps development environments, and allow a threat modelingprocess which is simple enough to allow non-security experts toparticipate in the threat modeling process and to benefit from theoutputs of the system/method.

In implementations a compensating control record in the database mayinclude a definition or details which include: an articulation of therigor and intent of a prescribed security requirement which thecompensating control is meant to satisfy; a defensive level of thecompensating control; security and defensive capabilities of thecompensating control, and; additional risk imposed by not adhering tothe prescribed security requirement.

Systems and methods described herein may have other features that havenot been described in detail. Users may be able to access the interfacesof the system through a web page, as described, and may be able toregister using user accounts, with login credentials, functionality forretrieving lost passwords etc. Individual users may be able to importcustom libraries and other elements into the database including customcomponents, threats, threat agents, test cases, security requirements,code snippets, code reviews, data elements, roles (developer, customer,user, admin, etc.), widgets, component types, attributes, templates,threat models, and the like. In implementations widgets may be a subsetof components and may include reusable modular components that may beincluded in some components. Some examples of widgets may be, bynon-limiting example: forms, cookies, banners, embedded video, RSSfeeds, SMS functionality, SILVERLIGHT, secure hardware token, fileupload, XML parser, and so forth. Widgets may be associated with threatsthrough the database, using an interface similar to interface 600 (butaccessible by selecting “widgets” from interface 700), and may be addedto any diagram in the same way that components are added, which mayinclude defining communication protocols between the widget and othercomponents/widgets. Widgets may in implementations comprise identifyinginformation about a component, user roles which can interact with acomponent, and the means by which the component receives, transmits, orstores data elements.

In implementations a software installation on one or more computingdevices to implement the systems and methods may include storing in thedatabase default libraries, such as over 650 threats, and a number ofstandard or default definitions for components, default risk levels tochoose from, though the user may set up custom threats and associationsthrough the database (which essentially sets up custom risk algorithms),custom risk levels to choose from, and so forth, as described above. Theability of the user to diagram a system, application or process visuallyallows for non-security experts to analyze threats using a threat model.In implementations, previously generated diagrams may be able to beimported into the system using a PDF or VIZIO drawing.

In implementations the system is configured to interface withthird-party software applications and libraries (including software as aservice (SAAS)) services, by communicating with the third-partysoftware/library using its application programming interface (API). Thismay be used, for example, to store standards from standards-issuingbodies in the database and to associate them with security requirementsand/or compensating controls through the database. This may assist auser to determine when a component added to a diagrammed threat modelwould qualify as a compensating control as defined by the standardsissuing body. The system may be said to include a “contextual threatengine,” which is the underlying database relations allowing the systemto dynamically update the threat model each time a component is mappedonto the canvas, or connected with another component using acommunication protocol, or when a protocol is changed or deleted, or acomponent removed, etc. The systems and methods described hereinfacilitate comprehensive enterprise-level attack surface analysis.Different users may use different interfaces within an organization insome implementations. Information technology (IT) professionals maydefine the actors, threats, components, etc. specific to anorganization, non-IT professionals may map out systems using the canvas,executives may review the high-level threat details included in the homepage or threat model, and so forth (though in other organizations anyuser may use any interface).

In implementations one or more user inputs may be used using one or moreuser interfaces to import a threat model from a third-party software ordatabase into the system. When this is done an administrator may mapcomponents or elements of the imported threat model to stored componentsof the system so that the relevant threats and etc. will be included inthe imported threat model. Along these lines, it is pointed out herethat both end users and administrators are “users” of the system as thatterm is used herein. Accordingly, when the claims refer to “one or moreuser inputs” these inputs may be carried out by an end user and/or theymay be carried out by an administrator, such as an administratormaintaining a cloud database which several different end users areaccessing to implement different deployments of the method/system.

It is further pointed out that systems and methods disclosed herein mayuse multiple computing devices, interfaces, displays, databases, and soforth. For example, any attack simulation system disclosed herein couldinclude multiple computing devices (each having at least one display)and multiple databases in which data is stored, accessed, andmanipulated using multiple interfaces displayed on the displays of thecomputing devices. The computing devices may be remote from one anotherand coupled with the database(s) through the Internet and/or locally.Any attack simulation methods and/or threat model chaining methodsdisclosed herein may include receiving user inputs at multipleinterfaces displayed on displays of multiple computing devices coupledwith multiple databases to accomplish the method(s) at least in part bystoring, accessing and manipulating data in the databases. Bynon-limiting example, in implementations an administrator could accessthe one or more databases using an administrator computer to inputthreat model components, threats, compensating controls, and the like,and associate these elements with one another (and also may create somedefault threat models which the user may use or manipulate—for examplean “ATM” threat model by non-limiting example which an end user coulduse or include in his/her own diagrammed system, application orprocess), while an end user could access the one or more databases usinga separate remote computer to diagram a system, process or applicationand thereby generate a threat model to be displayed on the end usercomputer.

In places where the description above refers to specific embodiments ofthreat model chaining and attack simulation systems and related methods,one or more or many modifications may be made without departing from thespirit and scope thereof. Details of any specificembodiment/implementation described herein may, wherever possible, beapplied to any other specific implementation/embodiment describedherein.

What is claimed is:
 1. A threat model chaining method, comprising:providing one or more databases, the one or more databases comprising: aplurality of threat model components stored therein; a plurality ofthreats stored therein, each threat associated with at least one of thethreat model components through the one or more databases; and aplurality of compensating controls stored therein, each compensatingcontrol associated with at least one of the threats through the one ormore databases; providing one or more interfaces, including a diagraminterface, configured to be displayed on one or more end user computingdevices communicatively coupled with the one or more databases;configuring the diagram interface to display a relational diagram of oneof a system, an application, and a process, using visual representationsof one or more of the threat model components and visual representationsof one or more of the compensating controls, the relational diagramdefining a first threat model, and; configuring the diagram interfaceto, in response to receiving one or more user inputs, add a componentgroup to the first threat model and thereby redefine the first threatmodel by including in it a second threat model associated with thecomponent group, wherein the component group comprises a predefinedinterrelated group of two or more of the threat model components.
 2. Thethreat model chaining method of claim 1, further comprising configuringthe diagram interface to, in response to receiving a user selection ofone of the diagrammed threat model components of the first threat model,visually display attack paths of all threats associated with thediagrammed threat model components which compromise the selected threatmodel component.
 3. The threat model chaining method of claim 1, furthercomprising configuring the one or more interfaces to, in response toreceiving one or more user inputs, store one or more additional threatmodel components in the one or more databases, store one or moreadditional threats in the one or more databases, associate eachadditional threat with at least one of the additional threat modelcomponents through the one or more databases, store one or moreadditional compensating controls in the one or more databases, andassociate each additional compensating control with at least one of theadditional threats through the one or more databases.
 4. An attacksimulation method, comprising: providing one or more databases, the oneor more databases comprising: a plurality of threat model componentsstored therein; a plurality of threats stored therein, each threatassociated with at least one of the threat model components through theone or more databases; and a plurality of compensating controls storedtherein, each compensating control associated with at least one of thethreats through the one or more databases; providing one or moreinterfaces, including a diagram interface, configured to be displayed onone or more end user computing devices communicatively coupled with theone or more databases; configuring the diagram interface to display arelational diagram of one of a system, an application, and a process,using visual representations of one or more of the threat modelcomponents and visual representations of one or more of the compensatingcontrols, the relational diagram defining a first threat model; andconfiguring the diagram interface to, in response to receiving a userselection of one of the diagrammed threat model components of the firstthreat model through the one or more interfaces, visually display attackpaths of all threats associated with the diagrammed threat modelcomponents which compromise the selected threat model component.
 5. Theattack simulation method of claim 4, further comprising configuring thediagram interface to, in response to receiving one or more user inputsthrough the one or more interfaces, visually display one or more attackpaths which pass through multiple diagrammed threat model components ofthe first threat model.
 6. The attack simulation method of claim 4,further comprising configuring the diagram interface to, in response toreceiving a user toggle of one of the diagrammed compensating controls(hereinafter “first control”) of the first threat model to an on statethrough the one or more interfaces, toggle all attack paths mitigatableby the first control to a mitigated display state.
 7. The attacksimulation method of claim 6, further comprising configuring the diagraminterface to, in response to receiving a user toggle of the firstcontrol to an off state through the one or more interfaces, toggle allattack paths mitigatable by the first control to an unmitigated displaystate.
 8. The attack simulation method of claim 6, further comprisingconfiguring the diagram interface to, in response to receiving one ormore user inputs through the one or more interfaces to remove the firstcontrol from the first threat model, toggle all attack paths mitigatableby the first control to an unmitigated display state.
 9. The attacksimulation method of claim 4, further comprising configuring the diagraminterface to, in response to receiving one or more user inputs throughthe one or more interfaces, visually display only attack paths of allthreats associated with a subset of the diagrammed threat modelcomponents.
 10. The attack simulation method of claim 4, furthercomprising configuring the diagram interface to, in response toreceiving one or more user inputs through the one or more interfaces toalter a profile of an attacking component, alter the visually displayedattack paths.
 11. The attack simulation method of claim 3, furthercomprising configuring the diagram interface to receive one or more userinputs to add a component group to the first threat model and therebyredefine the first threat model by including in it a second threat modelassociated with the component group, wherein the component groupcomprises a predefined interrelated group of two or more of the threatmodel components.
 12. An attack simulation system, comprising: one ormore computing devices communicatively coupled with one or moredatabases, the one or more computing devices displaying, on one or moredisplays of the one or more computing devices: one or more inputinterfaces configured to, in response to receiving one or more userinputs, store a plurality of user-defined threat model components in theone or more databases, store a plurality of threats in the one or moredatabases, associate each of the threats with at least one of the threatmodel components through the one or more databases, store a plurality ofcompensating controls in the one or more databases, and associate eachcompensating control with at least one of the threats through the one ormore databases, and; a diagram interface configured to, in response toreceiving one or more user inputs, diagram one of a system, anapplication, and a process, the diagram including one or more of thethreat model components and one or more of the compensating controls, todefine a first threat model, the first threat model including allthreats associated through the one or more databases with the diagrammedthreat model components; wherein the diagram interface is configured to,in response to receiving a selection of one of the diagrammed threatmodel components of the first threat model, visually display attackpaths of all threats associated with the diagrammed threat modelcomponents which compromise the selected threat model component.
 13. Theattack simulation system of claim 12, wherein the diagram interface isconfigured to, in response to receiving a user input to toggle one ofthe diagrammed compensating controls (hereinafter “first control”) to anon state, toggle all attack paths mitigatable by the first control to amitigated display state.
 14. The attack simulation system of claim 13,wherein the diagram interface is configured to, in response to receivinga user input to toggle the first control to an off state, toggle allattack paths mitigatable by the first control to an unmitigated displaystate.
 15. The attack simulation system of claim 13, wherein the diagraminterface is configured to, in response to receiving one or more userinputs removing the first control from the first threat model, toggleall attack paths mitigatable by the first control to an unmitigateddisplay state.
 16. The attack simulation system of claim 12, wherein thediagram interface is configured to, in response to receiving one or moreuser inputs, visually display only attack paths of all threatsassociated with a subset of the diagrammed threat model components. 17.The attack simulation system of claim 12, wherein the diagram interfaceis configured to, in response to receiving one or more user inputs,alter a profile of an attacking component, wherein the alteration altersthe visually displayed attack paths.
 18. The attack simulation system ofclaim 12, wherein the one of a system, an application, and a processcomprises a computing network.
 19. The attack simulation system of claim18, wherein the diagram interface is further configured to, in responseto receiving one or more user inputs, diagram a communication protocolbetween two of the diagrammed threat model components, the diagrammedcommunication protocol including an alphanumeric indicator.
 20. Theattack simulation system of claim 12, wherein the diagram interface isconfigured to, in response to receiving one or more user inputs, add acomponent group to the first threat model and thereby redefine the firstthreat model by including in it a second threat model associated withthe component group, wherein the component group comprises a predefinedinterrelated group of two or more of the threat model components.